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Epilogue
EPILOGUE: THEORY IN THE BASEMENT
Maureen N. Armour
Mary Spector
heory vs. Practice. The debate occurs on law campuses, in bar
committees and in legislatures. It is a debate that has come to
embody many of the challenges facing modern legal education.
Many see theory and practice as being mutually exclusive, if not down
right hostile.' Some scholars see the "theory-practice" dichotomy as hostile to the theoretical perspective, valuing practice over theory. 2 Ironically, clinicians often see the duality invoked to value theory over
practice. However, as the academy considers its approach to professional
education, there are lawyers and3 legal academics who find theory and
practice inextricably intertwined.
As Professor Martfnez notes in his introduction, the growth of a strong
relationship, even partnership, between clinicians and critical theorists
provides empirical evidence that "theory and practice" are not antithetical. As the authors in this symposium demonstrate, the academy need
not value one element over the other. This symposium demonstrates how
the practice of law enriches our view of theoretical issues and how, in
turn, theoretical considerations enhance clinical teaching and learning.
Why, then are these two elements of legal education pitted against each
other?
Any dichotomy is merely a matter of perspective. From a clinical perspective there is no conflict between "theory and practice." A problem
as simple as a justice court's challenge to a pauper's affidavit raises a
number of theoretical issues that include questions of procedure, sociology, doctrine and policy that the clinic student must confront in the
course of representation. The student must develop a rapport with her
client as she asks hard questions to determine whether her client satisfies
the statute's definition of indigency. She must engage in statutory interpretation as she considers whether the statute permits the court to chal1. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Steven Lubet, Is Legal Theory Good
for Anything?, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 193 (1997).
2. See George Martinez, Foreword: Theory, Practice,and Clinical Legal Education, 51
SMU L. REV. 1419 (1998).
3. See Jules Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice,83 GEO. L. J. 2579 (1995).
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lenge a pauper's affidavit on its own motion. She will think about
institutional and political issues regarding access to courts and whether
statutes purportedly designed to increase access, in reality place additional burdens on poor litigants. As she drafts her pleadings and prepares
for her hearing, she will also consider strategic issues related to the role
of the advocate in representing an indigent client before a potentially
hostile tribunal.
Professor Dubin's description of the history of the modern law school
sheds light on "theory-practice" debate. 4 Prior to the appropriation of
legal education by colleges in post-graduate programs, legal training was
acquired through an apprenticeship-on the job training. The aspirant
would affiliate with a practitioner to learn the law and eventually take an
examination for a license. As formal legal education moved into the academy and took the form of post-graduate professional training, 5 divisions
between theory and practice emerged. In this educational model, the
teaching of law occurred in classrooms using the case method and focused
on doctrine. This shift away from apprenticeships signaled a rejection of
the practice-based approach to legal training.
In the 1920s and 1930s, isolated voices saw this shift toward theory as
an unwelcome rejection of the practice-based approach and called for inclusion of the practice-based model in the curriculum. 6 Discussions of
the relative merits of a theoretical or practical approach to legal education simmered on and off campuses for nearly 60 years. Professor Dubin
describes how the most recent product of that debate, the 1992 publication of the American Bar Association's report on law schools and the
profession 7 resulted in the expansion of the classroom model to incorporate non-client, simulation courses in interviewing, counseling, trial advocacy, and negotiation. This approach may have unconsciously served to
widen the perceived gap between theory and practice in the legal academy by creating the sense that "skills" training was nothing more than the
technical mastery over a set of discrete tasks. 8 Professor Dubin suggests
that emphasis on skills often occurred at the expense of the broader, theoretical issues necessarily implicated in the practice of law. As he points
out, skills training in the clinical context has moved beyond this narrow
definition of "practice" to explicitly incorporate the concerns that contemporary legal theory raises.
4. See John C. Dubin, Clinical Designfor Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV.
1461 (1998).
5. See Mark Spiegel, An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 580-86
(1987).
6. See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L REV. 907
(1933).
7. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BARD, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSIONS: NARROW-

1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
8. See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 590.
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Clinical education today embodies the best of these educational developments. As Professors P6rez and Johnson point out, however, it is not
without some constraints. 9 All of the authors recognize that students enrolled in clinical programs can learn skills as they apply critical lawyer
theory, the theoretics of practice, and law's potential to bring about social
change through what Professor Dubin calls "holistic representation and
service." 10 Although Professor Chavkin's article differs from the others
as he demonstrates how clinical education can provide a framework to
explore important theoretical questions grounded in the everyday practice of law, he uses the clinical model to explore the theoretical dimensions of the attorney-client relationship.1 1
This symposium demonstrates that despite clinics' focus on "practice,"
clinical education is more than simply "practical."' 2 Clinicians embrace
theoretical perspectives in their teaching and in their research and writing. The articles included in this symposium provide a realistic sense of
clinical education today and reinforce the belief that any gap between
13
theory and practice is illusory.

9. See Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda P6rez, Clinical Legal Education and the U.C.
Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practice into Theory, 51
SMU L. REV. 1423 (1998).
10. Dubin, supra note 4, at 44.
11. See David Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1998).
12. See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 590.
13. See Rodney J. Uphoff et al., Preparingthe New Law Graduate to Practice Law: A
View from the Trenches, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 381 (1997); Amy D. Ronner, Some In-House
Appellate Litigation Clinic's Lessons in ProfessionalResponsibility: Musical Stories of Candor and the Sandbag, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 859 (1996); Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Justice
Who Never Graduates: Law Schools and the Judicial Endeavor, 68 IND. L. J. 621 (1993);
Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpiral: The Ethics of Feminism and ClinicalEducation,
75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991).
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